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There is a contradiction at the heart of the law of limitation periods. This lies in the conflict 
between the need to promote certainty (traditionally one of the key aims of having 
limitation periods in the first place1) and the need to avoid barring a claim at a time earlier 
than the prospective claimant had any reasonable opportunity to prosecute his case2. This is 
a contradiction which has great significance for practitioners as well as litigants. Failing to 
issue proceedings within a limitation period is one of the surest ways to a claim for 
professional negligence3, but the greater the levels of uncertainty as to when a claim is out 
of time the greater the difficulties in advising with confidence. This contradiction exists in 
most areas of modern limitation law but is somewhat compounded in the case of personal 
injury claims by the extra layer of uncertainty built into the system. This additional feature is 
the discretion granted to courts by section 33 Limitation Act 1980 to allow a claim to 
proceed even though it is out of time in relation to what might be called the primary 
limitation period4. The aim of this article is to consider the manner in which courts approach 
the exercise of that discretion in order to ascertain whether this important jurisdictional 
area of procedural law is operating in a way which best achieves the varied and 
contradictory aims it seeks to address. 
Limitation Act 1980 
It will, first, be necessary to set out the relevant provisions of the Limitation Act, 
albeit reasonably briefly. Although the focus of this article is on the discretionary power 
contained in section 33, it is important to understand how the Act sets the primary 
limitation period in order to appreciate how section 33 operates. In relation to personal 
injury claims, with which this article is concerned, the starting point is section 11. This 
provides that for any action which includes a claim for damages for personal injuries the 
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limitation period is 3 years from the date on which the cause of action accrued, or, if later, 3 
years from the claimant’s ‘date of knowledge’. 
Date of knowledge is, in turn, defined in section 14 as the date on which the claimant had 
knowledge of certain relevant facts. These are, principally, the identity of the defendant, the 
fact that the ‘injury in question was significant’ and the fact that ‘the injury was attributable 
in whole or in part to the act or omission which is alleged to constitute negligence…’ 
Knowledge of law (as opposed to fact) is not required but, by section 14(3), the claimant’s 
knowledge includes constructive as well as actual knowledge, that is to say that knowledge 
which ‘he might reasonably have been expected to acquire...’ 
In determining the primary limitation period, therefore, the law operates what is generally 
known as a ‘discoverability’ approach, that is to say that no limitation period begins to run 
unless and until the claimant discovers (or is deemed to have discovered, constructively) the 
facts that give rise to a cause of action5. Discoverability has formed part of the limitation 
period in personal injury cases since the Limitation Act 1963 and arose out of the 
controversial House of Lords decision in Cartledge v E. Jopling & Sons Ltd6. In that case a 
group of steel workers were found to be out of time in relation to a claim for silicosis, an 
insidious and slowly developing chest condition caused by industrial dust exposure, at a 
time when their symptoms remained at a sufficiently low level that no reasonable claimant 
was likely to have embarked on litigation at that stage. The existence of discoverability 
provisions within the law means that prospective claimants have some measure of 
protection. A claimant may not satisfy the requirements of discoverability until many years 
after the cause of action has accrued, especially in relation to insidious industrial disease 
claims, but also in relation to claims of clinical negligence whereby a claimant may 
legitimately assume that his adverse outcome is merely one of those things until he acquires 
sufficient knowledge to put him on the trail of possible negligence7.   
Section 33 discretion, therefore, provides an additional level of protection for personal 
injury claimants over and above that offered by discoverability. Section 33(1) permits a 
court to allow an action to proceed notwithstanding that it is brought outside the time limit 
prescribed by sections 11 and 14 if the court considers it would be ‘equitable’ to do so. In 
determining this the court is directed to have regard to the degree to which the claimant 
would be prejudiced by the operation of the primary limitation period, and the degree to 
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which the defendant would be prejudiced by allowing the claim to proceed. The section 
does not use the word ‘balance’ but this is, clearly, an exercise in the court balancing the 
competing interests of claimant and defendant8. In carrying out this balance (and exercising 
the discretion thereby conferred) the court is required to have regard to all the 
circumstances of the case and, in particular, the 6 specific factors listed in section 33(3). I 
will return to the section 33(3) factors but they include, most importantly, the length of and 
reasons for the delay on the part of the claimant, and the extent to which that delay has 
effected the cogency of the evidence.          
What might section 33 be seeking to achieve? 
It is submitted that section 33 needs to be judged against four measures of its effectiveness. 
Two of these have already been mentioned but need to be expanded on a little. 
The first of these is the need to provide a fair and just outcome for claimants9. Despite the 
protections offered to claimants by the discoverability approach there may still be many 
reasons why seemingly deserving claimants find themselves outside the primary limitation 
period. The most obvious example may be those claimants who are in possession of all the 
facts necessary to establish discoverability but who do not pursue a claim because they do 
not know those facts give rise to a cause of action. It will be recalled that section 14 makes 
clear that knowledge of fact only is required to begin the running of the limitation period. 
There is no requirement of knowing that those facts give rise to a claim in law. So, a 
claimant may be aware that he is injured by virtue of something the defendant has done, 
but may have no idea that this permits him to launch a claim10. A further example (not 
totally unrelated) may be a claimant who has no actual knowledge of the relevant facts but 
is found to have constructive knowledge based upon what he should reasonably have 
known11. In such circumstances time will run against a claimant who, as a matter of reality, 
has no ability to pursue a claim. These are, for present purposes, no more than illustrations 
of situations in which a claimant may feel that he has a legitimate reason for not 
commencing proceedings within his primary limitation period. 
The second measure against which section 33 must be judged is the degree to which it 
provides (or fails to provide) some certainty for defendants in the sense of repose12. Repose 
is the idea that a party can move on from a certain act (or omission) safe in the knowledge 
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that the party is no longer susceptible to legal action in relation to that act13. Repose may 
have commercial aspects (the party may wish to change their position in a way in which 
they cannot easily or safely do if the possibility of a future action remains14) or it may have 
psychological factors, at least in so far as the party is a human actor (the party may wish to 
be free of the worry or anxiety of possible future claims). It is not difficult to see that the 
existence of section 33 discretion has the potential to be almost wholly antipathetic to 
repose in that sense. Section 33 is open ended. There is (theoretically, at least) no point in 
time when the defendant can be certain that he has repose in respect of any specific act.  
The third measure against which section 33 must be judged is closely related to the inter-
relationship between the first two. This is the degree to which section 33 helps foster or 
hinder the underlying substantive law operating in this area. As we are dealing here with 
personal injury claims that is, overwhelmingly, the law of negligence. This requires some 
degree of consideration of the purpose (or purposes) being served by the law of negligence. 
The problem here is that the degree of academic effort that has gone into seeking to 
determine what is the underlying purpose of negligence law is enormous, and despite those 
efforts this remains contested terrain15. This is not the place to rehearse, let alone join, that 
debate. But for my purposes here there is probably enough common ground. That common 
ground would seem to revolve around the notion of corrective justice which, for the 
present, I will take to mean that wrongdoers should be required to make good their victims 
(in so far as money compensation can achieve this), in the absence of a sufficiently powerful 
countervailing interest. As Lord Steyn has put it ‘…the public policy which has first claim on 
the loyalty of the law is that wrongs should be remedied…16’.   But even most of those who 
accept that negligence law is fundamentally about corrective justice equally accept that 
there may be good reasons to depart from corrective justice in some situations. When a 
sufficient reason exists to depart from corrective justice in a particular instance is equally a 
cause of much controversy but that negligence involves a balancing between corrective 
justice and other interests (often titled distributive justice, although this is something of a 
catch-all) is probably more capable of a level of agreement17. Limitation law may be 
jurisdictional rather than substantive but the degree to which section 33 provides a 
defensible balance between corrective and distributive justice is a relevant consideration. 
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The fourth measure is certainty. It may be objected that certainty has already been dealt 
with – is repose not about certainty? Repose may be an aspect of certainty but there is a 
more general sense (perhaps, even, a more prosaic sense) in which certainty is in issue. This 
is certainty of outcome. Litigation is an expensive (and sometimes traumatic) business. 
Users of the law are likely to require a sufficient degree of certainty of outcome before they 
invest their money or themselves in the bringing or defending of an action. In the law, of 
course, certainty is rarely absolute. But the fear that may often be induced by the use of the 
word ‘discretion’ is that the law may become no more than a series of separate instances, 
unconnected by any over-arching unity. The law, as has been recognised by Smith LJ, risks 
becoming ‘a lottery for litigants’18 The certainty issue, therefore, is not about removing all 
unpredictability, but rather of keeping the predictability deficit within reasonable bounds so 
that users of the law can make informed choices. The nature of the uncertainty issue was 
illustrated in Cain v Francis19. This involved two conjoined appeals. Both concerned road 
traffic accidents where claims were made early and liability was admitted by insurers. In 
both cases, however, proceedings were not issued within the primary limitation period. In 
one the delay in issuing proceedings amounted to one day, in the other to one year. Two 
separate trial judges hearing applications under section 33 allowed the claim to proceed in 
the case of the longer delay but declined to do so in the case of the shorter. In the Court of 
Appeal Smith LJ accepted that these outcomes were, on the face of it, somewhat 
incongruous. Notwithstanding the relative unwillingness of an appeal court to interfere in 
the exercise of discretion by a trial judge some level of guidance was clearly required20.   
What do we mean by discretion? 
The nature of judicial discretion is something else which has occupied much academic 
writing. It is a word used very frequently when debating the actions of judges and is, in 
many senses, ubiquitous in the operation of the legal system. The problem (perhaps) with 
the word, however, is that it spans a number of various meanings which describe very 
different activities. As a consequence the use of the word discretion without further 
explanation has the potential to obscure rather than elucidate what is actually going on. 
What does it mean to say that judges are making a discretionary decision under section 33? 
For Dworkin there were three different types of discretion.  ‘First, we say that a man has 
discretion if his duty is defined by standards that reasonable men can interpret in different 
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ways…Second, we say that a man has discretion if his decision is final, in the sense that no 
higher authority may review and set aside that decision…Third, we say a man has discretion 
when some set of standards which impose duties upon him do not in fact purport to impose 
any duty as to a particular decision…21’. The first two of these Dworkin considered to be 
‘weak’ discretion, the third he described as ‘strong’ discretion22. Dworkin was relatively 
uninterested in the two forms of weak discretion. Rather his concern lay in what we might 
call the developmental strong discretion, whereby judges are determining whether to 
develop the law in one direction or another. So, for example, when faced with the decision 
whether or not to develop the equitable notion of breach of confidence into a tort of misuse 
of private information the House of Lords in Campbell was, presumably, exercising the kind 
of strong discretion which interested (and concerned) Dworkin23. We probably do not need 
to explore further Dworkin’s views on this type of discretion because that does not seem to 
be what is going on in the section 33 cases. Rather, judges deciding section 33 disputes 
seem to be exercising weak discretion in the first sense of Dworkin’s taxonomy. That is to 
say, they are applying standards which can be interpreted in different ways by reasonable 
people. This ‘discretion by judgment’ might be styled as a ‘someone has to decide’ 
discretion. This is the most commonly exercised discretion in the legal system. This is the 
kind of discretion that judges exercise when operating as fact finders. If the claimant says 
that what happened was X, while the defendant says that what happened was Y, then 
someone has to decide which of those two is correct. Judges are granted that role. Provided 
that both accounts have some element of plausibility a judge is making a discretionary 
choice to accept one version over another, based on a myriad of factors, including 
consistency (both internal and also in relation to other available evidence) but also including 
such highly subjective elements as the demeanour of witnesses. There is no directed 
outcome. If we were to put the same evidence in front of several different judges it is likely 
that there would be different outcomes. This type of discretion is not developmental in that 
it does not change the law, it merely determines the result. As a consequence it has had 
more limited academic attention. It is, however, not merely frequent, but also, often, 
determinative, because there are many cases where the dispute of fact is the only issue, and 
the findings of fact by the trial judge determine the outcome.   
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This kind of weak ‘someone has to decide’ discretion is, therefore, problematic in terms of 
users of the legal system because it can give rise to high levels of unpredictability of 
outcome. This is, however, inherent in the nature of an adjudicative system. Whenever a 
dispute exists on matters of fact it will always be true that someone has to decide. While 
section 33 disputes are not disputes of fact, they fall into a similar ‘someone has to decide’ 
scenario. The fact that such discretion exists in, and is integral to, the operation of the 
system may have relevance for the fourth measure against which we may need to judge 
section 33 discretion – that is certainty of outcome. While we may be concerned about the 
predictability deficit of section 33, we do need to bear in mind that section 33 is not turning 
a highly predictable system into a highly unpredictable one – it is merely adding a layer of 
unpredictability to a system for which some levels of unpredictability are already inherent. 
This is not to say that the reduction of the predictability deficit to the lowest level 
achievable consistently with seeking to achieve other aims is not desirable. Satisfying this 
requirement while continuing to allow discretionary decisions requires a consideration of 
the principles and policies within which the judge is exercising this discretion. If we want to 
ensure that we have a system which reduces the predictability deficit as far as possible then 
we must consider what constraints exist on the way judges carry out this task. If there are 
no such constraints, or they are insufficiently directive, then section 33 decisions do risk 
becoming a series of separate and isolated outcomes. For the most part, the more varied 
and complex these constraints are, the greater the likely predictability deficit. 
In relation to section 33 there are two possible sources of such restricting principles and 
policies. There is the statute itself and there is the interpretation of the statute imposed by 
the higher courts.  
Guidance from the statute  
Those looking for much constraining guidance in the wording of section 33(1) itself may find 
limited assistance. Courts are directed to consider which outcome is ‘equitable’ having 
regard to the balance of prejudice between claimant and defendant, and, in doing so, to 
consider all the circumstances of the case. It can readily be seen that this is likely to produce 
little constraining guidance to judges and, by itself, does not help greatly to reduce the 
predictability deficit. Indeed, courts have indicated that the discretion conferred by section 
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33 is wide and unfettered. This was made clear early by Lord Denning in Firman v Ellis24. 
Lord Denning was alive to the issues of predictability and offered the following comfort to 
users of the legal system – ‘…the judges in making their decisions set a pattern from which 
the profession can forecast the likely result in any given set of circumstances25’. This may 
have proved to be optimistic. 
Although there may be little constraining guidance in section 33(1), it is legitimate to 
consider to what extent the factors listed in subsection 3 may help this cause. These are, it 
will be recalled, a list of specific factors set out in the statute which the court is directed to 
‘have regard to’ in addition to also considering ‘all the circumstances of the case’. The status 
of these specific factors has been considered by the courts. The general conclusion is that 
these represent Parliament’s best estimate of the kind of factors most often likely to be 
relevant but that they are not exclusive or exhaustive26.  
The 6 factors themselves represent something of an odd mix, being described by Lord 
Diplock as ‘a curious hotchpotch27’. One reason for this is that it is not altogether clear how 
some of them are meant to relate to the concept of prejudice. For example, while it is 
reasonably apparent why the length of the delay may map onto to issues of prejudice, it is 
less clear how the claimant’s reasons for the delay do so, unless prejudice is being 
determined in some pseudo-moralistic way of seeking to assess whether the claimant is 
somehow deserving.  This may indicate a more general issue, which is that courts are being 
directed under section 33 to consider two concepts which do not, on the face of it, seem to 
be addressing the same thing. The primary direction is to consider what is equitable. This 
clearly has connotations of fairness and it is easy to see how the claimant’s reasons (or 
excuses) for the delay would fit into this. But they are being directed to consider what is 
equitable in the context of prejudice and it is much less easy to see why a defendant is 
prejudiced any more by a claimant with a poor excuse than by a claimant with a good one. 
Guidance from the courts 
Perhaps it is no surprise that we might conclude that looking to the words of the statute 
alone will provide limited constraining guidance. Such a generally worded provision clearly 
will require judicial interpretation. But if we look to the courts for clear guidance we may 
conclude that we look in vain. This in not because of lack of opportunity. If we take as a 
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reference point the important Court of Appeal decision in KR v Bryn Alyn Community 
(Holdings) Ltd (in liquidation) and others28 section 33 has found itself under consideration in 
the Court of Appeal on 23 occasions and in the House of Lords/Supreme Court on 3 in the 14 
years since, an average of almost 2 cases in the higher courts per year. Those figures by 
themselves may give some cause for concern. The fact that so many litigants find it 
worthwhile to invest the time, energy and money in pursuing an appeal, and the fact that 
appeal courts grant leave for them to do so, would suggest a significant lack of confidence in 
the outcomes being returned by first instance judges.  
With so many cases going to the appeal courts over that period of time, not to mention 
those heard earlier than that, there will be inevitable difficulties in imposing any sense of 
order on the sheer volume of material. Ploughing through the cases chronologically is 
unlikely to elucidate a great deal, rather it seems preferable to attempt to identify themes 
which might provide a source of some helpful informing guidance.  
The nature of the claimant’s task 
While there is no dispute that it is the claimant who bears the burden of proof under section 
33, the courts have not been entirely consistent as to the nature of the claimant’s task in 
discharging that burden. This was an issue considered early on by the courts. Lord Denning 
in Firman v Ellis noted that the Law Reform Committee whose report led to the enactment 
of what is now section 33 discretion had recommended a limited discretion, expressed as 
being for a ‘residual class of cases’ but went on to note that the legislation imposed no such 
restrictions29. Accordingly, Lord Denning’s position was that this was a wide, unfettered 
discretion. Despite what might have been regarded as Lord Denning’s clear and definitive 
viewpoint, the Court of Appeal has subsequently flirted with what might be called the 
‘heavy burden’ doctrine, that is to say that the claimant bears not merely a normal civil 
burden of proof but some form of heavier, if largely unquantified, burden. The heavy 
burden doctrine is not, necessarily, inconsistent with Lord Denning’s view of the unfettered 
nature of the discretion. Arguably they are addressing different issues. Lord Denning is 
dealing with the question of whether the type of case to which section 33 applies is 
somehow limited; the heavy burden doctrine may start from the premise that the discretion 
is available in all cases but may expect the claimant to do something more onerous in order 
to convince a court to exercise that discretion in his favour.   
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The origins of the heavy burden doctrine can be traced to the decision of the Court of 
Appeal in KR and others v Bryn Alyn Community (Holdings) Ltd (in liquidation) and another30. 
This was a consolidated action involving a number of claimants who alleged physical and/or 
sexual abuse in the defendant’s childrens’ home many years earlier. The number of 
claimants involved and the complex facts led to the Court of Appeal dealing with a large 
number of different issues during the course of the appeal. Auld LJ, giving the judgment of 
the court, did, however, take the opportunity to review some general principles as he saw 
them. Thus, he said, ‘[T]he burden of showing that it would be equitable to disapply the 
limitation period lies on the claimant and it is a heavy burden. Another way of putting it is 
that it is an exceptional indulgence to a claimant, to be granted only where equity between 
the parties demands it…’31 In support of his position Auld LJ prays in aid a statement of Lord 
Diplock in the House of Lords in Thompson v Brown where he said of the exercise of 
discretion that ‘[t]his is by way of exception, for unless the court does make a direction the 
primary limitation period will continue to apply32’. With respect to Auld LJ, his interpretation 
is open to two criticisms. In the first place it does not seem to map on to the statutory 
language, which gives no hint of the placing upon the claimant of any especially heavy 
burden. In the second place he would appear to make rather too much of the statement of 
Lord Diplock which he uses to shore up his position. To describe something as an 
‘exception’, as Lord Diplock does, is rather different from describing it as an ‘exceptional 
indulgence’. Lord Diplock makes it clear that when he is using the word ‘exception’ he is 
doing no more than describing the factual reality – the case is out of time except when the 
court decides to exercise its discretion in favour of the claimant. To elevate that, as Auld LJ 
does, into a proposition about the nature of the claimant’s burden is unconvincing. 
Notwithstanding this, the heavy burden doctrine was taken up in subsequent cases in the 
Court of Appeal33.  
However, the heavy burden doctrine has come in for criticism and, it is submitted, that the 
preponderance of authority is against it. In Kew v Bettamix Ltd34  Leveson LJ reverts to the 
original meaning of Lord Diplock’s statement (and, indeed, seeks to deny that Auld LJ was 
seeking to state anything different)35.  The matter is put at its clearest by Smith LJ in Ministry 
of Defence v AB and others when she referred to Auld LJ’s heavy burden doctrine as being 
‘no longer good law’36. As she noted, ‘the court’s duty is to do what is fair’37. 
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So, while on the face of it it can be said that there is conflicting Court of Appeal authority on 
the matter, the heavy burden doctrine can probably now be regarded as an historical blip38. 
Exercise of the discretion is exceptional only in the sense of being an exception and while 
the claimant bears the burden of proof that burden is not subject to some especially high 
threshold.  
 
 
The prejudice to the defendant 
The balancing exercise inherent in section 33 requires a consideration of the relative 
prejudice suffered by the claimant and the defendant. Leaving aside the question of the 
impact the passage of time may have on the possibility of a fair trial (to which I will return) 
what is the nature of the prejudice suffered by the defendant? Put another way, what is it 
that the defendant has lost if the court allows the claimant’s claim to proceed?  
Most obviously, of course, the defendant has lost his limitation defence and has to face, on 
the merits, a claim he would otherwise have avoided. So, what is the significance of (and the 
weight to be assigned to) the loss of that defence?      
The earlier cases were not unanimous on this point. In Hartley v Birmingham City District 
Council39, a case where proceedings were issued one day late, Parker LJ was doubtful as to 
whether or not loss of the limitation defence as such was ever likely to count for much in 
the process of balancing. His rationale for this was that that loss would almost always be 
equalled by the claimant’s loss of the ability to pursue her claim if permission to proceed 
was refused40.  Not long afterwards, however, in Nash v Eli Lilly41, also in the Court of 
Appeal, Purchas LJ cast doubt on the proposition of Parker LJ, at least as a proposition of 
general application42. For Purchas LJ, requiring a defendant to defend a case even if they 
may ultimately succeed on the merits, could not necessarily be dismissed so lightly. His 
concern seemed to relate particularly to circumstances in which the claimant’s case was 
poor and even if it was lost after an adjudication on the merits, putting the defendant to the 
effort of defending such a case might, he felt, outweigh the claimant’s prejudice in losing 
the ability to pursue a poor case43.     
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The issue these two cases raise might be referred to as the windfall doctrine – is the 
limitation defence a mere windfall for the defendant and, consequently, is the loss of that 
defence of limited concern in the section 33 balancing exercise? In asking this question it is 
important to distinguish two different situations: one in which the loss of the limitation 
defence causes some forensic prejudice to the defendant in defending the claim, a matter 
to which I will return, the other where what is being considered is the value of the loss of 
the limitation defence of itself. It is only the latter of these that can be termed a windfall. It 
is not difficult to see that a defendant who has suffered forensic prejudice in mounting a 
defence is in a different position from one who has not.  
In many ways there may be a connection between the windfall doctrine and the heavy 
burden doctrine. The idea that the claimant comes to the task with a particularly heavy 
burden would map on well to the idea that the defendant has lost something of intrinsically 
high value by virtue of losing the limitation defence. Perhaps the consignment of the heavy 
burden doctrine to history can equally suggest that the courts will be more open to seeing 
the limitation defence as no more than a mere windfall to which little weight needs to be 
attached.  
This was an issue addressed by Smith LJ in Cain v Francis44. This involved two claims in which 
there were no defences available to the defendants on the merits and, therefore, no issues 
of consequential forensic prejudice. The two trial judges had, however, adopted 
diametrically opposed approaches as to the significance of the loss of the limitation 
defences as such. As Smith LJ put it ‘there should be consistency of approach between 
judges on an issue as fundamental…’ as this45. After a lengthy review of the authorities 
Smith LJ concluded that ‘…in a case where the defendant has had early notice of the claim, 
the accrual of a limitation defence should be regarded as a windfall and the prospect of its 
loss, by the exercise of the section 33 discretion, should be regarded as either no prejudice 
at all…or only a slight degree of prejudice…It is whether the defendant has suffered any 
evidential or other forensic prejudice which should make the difference46’. This is a 
statement that requires some analysis. 
It will be noted that Smith LJ’s proposition is founded on the notion that the defendant has 
had early notice of the claim. This was clearly relevant on the facts of the cases before the 
court but, it is submitted, should not, of itself, be assumed to be decisive. As she goes on to 
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make clear the real question is the degree of forensic prejudice. Lack of forensic prejudice 
may arise not only in circumstances where there was early notification. It is, for example, 
possible to imagine a scenario in which an accident was fully and extensively investigated 
shortly after it occurred47, but where, for whatever reason, the claim comes only sometime 
later. It is submitted that the logic of Smith LJ’s position would be that that situation would 
not elevate in importance the loss of the limitation defence because the extent of the initial 
investigation would still mean that there is unlikely to be any significant forensic prejudice 
and all that is being lost is the limitation defence itself.  Equally, there may be cases where 
no such initial investigations took place but where the evidence on liability is sufficiently 
overwhelming that it is clear the defendant has no real defence on the merits. Again, such a 
case would not produce any forensic prejudice.   
The second point raised may be whether a defendant might have a legitimate ground of 
complaint in respect of the windfall doctrine. Might a defendant not say that we have been 
granted this defence by the will of Parliament and, effectively, to belittle the intrinsic value 
of that right is to undermine Parliament’s clear intent? While this argument may seem 
superficially attractive it tends to regard the limitation regime as a series of separate rights 
rather than as a scheme. While it is true that the legislation grants a limitation defence, and 
that defence must be regarded as important, it is equally true that that defence should not 
be viewed in isolation from the discretionary powers contained in section 33 that permit 
claimants to be relieved from the limitation defence. Once both parts of the limitation 
regime are seen holistically the notion of the limitation defence as a windfall makes more 
sense.  
The prejudice to the claimant 
On the face of it, what the claimant loses if not allowed to proceed is obvious – she loses her 
claim, irrespective of its substantive merits. But there are some claimants for whom the loss 
of that claim is less punitive than it is for others. Section 33 cases arise in many 
circumstances, but one such circumstance is where solicitors have negligently failed to issue 
proceedings in time, thereby allowing the claim to become time-barred in breach of the 
duty they owe to the claimant. So far as prejudice is concerned, what is the significance of 
the fact that such claimants will have a claim over against their original solicitors? 
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This is one area where the cases have presented a relatively consistent approach, even if it 
is one which may not help greatly to minimise the predictability deficit. This is that such a 
claim over is, as Smith LJ puts it in Cain v Francis ‘relevant but not determinative’48. What 
this seems to mean is that where the defendant has suffered some forensic prejudice then 
the fact that the claimant has another cause of action which he may pursue is a factor in the 
exercise of the discretion. But, at least in cases where there is no such forensic prejudice, 
the mere fact that the claimant may be able to look elsewhere for recompense is not, by 
itself, a reason to let the original defendant off the hook49.  That this is a relatively 
consistent position of the courts is confirmed by comments in Firman v Ellis50, one of the 
earliest Court of Appeal decisions on the discretionary power now found in section 33. Lord 
Denning MR was critical of the defendants’ submission that their liability (in the capacity of 
road traffic accident insurers) should be passed on to the insurers of the claimant’s 
negligent solicitors. As he put it, ‘[a]s a matter of simple justice it is the defendants’ insurers 
who should pay the plaintiff’s claim. They have received the premium to cover the risk of 
these accidents51’. While it is submitted that Lord Denning reaches the correct conclusion, 
his reason for doing so is less convincing. There are, of course, two sets of insurers 
interested in this case, the road traffic insurers of the original defendants and the 
professional negligence insurers of the solicitors. Both will have received a premium for 
insuring against the very risk that has materialised. It is not entirely clear that absolving the 
professional negligence insurers from liability is the obviously just outcome. There may be 
better justifications than those offered by Lord Denning. These are threefold. Firstly, there is 
what might be termed the inconvenience factor. A claimant would need to commence fresh 
proceedings against another party (his negligent solicitor) and incur the time and trouble 
involved in locating and instructing new solicitors to do so. At the very least that is likely to 
keep the claimant out of the compensation to which he is entitled for a longer period52. 
Secondly, in suing his former solicitors the claimant is suing a party who will be aware of any 
weaknesses which may have existed in the claimant’s case, whether as to liability or 
quantum. Thirdly, the nature of professional negligence claims is that they are claims for 
loss of a chance and, particularly if there are any issues on liability or causation, there is no 
guarantee that the claimant will receive against his former solicitors the full value of the 
original claim53. 
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A second theme in relation to the prejudice of the claimant is the presumptive value of what 
the claimant may be losing. This involves the court in making an assessment of the 
underlying claim to determine its ‘worthwhileness’. Despite a warning by the Court of 
Appeal of the dangers of basing any decision on the ultimate prospects of success, bearing 
in mind the generally interlocutory nature of limitation hearings54 the issue of 
proportionality seems to have become increasingly prominent. 
In McGhie v British Telecommunications Plc55 the claimant suffered a back injury at work in 
1998 but did not commence proceedings until 2003. The claimant’s medical evidence was to 
the effect that he had sustained an acceleration of a pre-existing back injury by a period of 
about 5 years. May LJ noted that ‘the pleaded case on liability is thin’56 and, further, that it 
appeared to have a value, if successful, of between £10,000 and £20,00057. These two 
factors, together with the length of the delay and the evidential prejudice that delay was 
considered to produce were mentioned specifically by May LJ as being the grounds on which 
the claimant’s application was refused58.  
The idea of proportionality is very much a ‘zeitgeist concept’ in litigation59 but the rationale 
of McGhie may be open to some criticism. If a claim can be demonstrated to have ‘no real 
prospect’ of success then powers already exist to grant summary judgment to the 
defendant60.  If a defendant is unable to surmount that hurdle the inevitable implication 
must be that there is a triable issue. It is not clear why a defendant should be given another 
route to what is, in effect, summary judgment with a lower threshold through the medium 
of section 33. The second criticism may be one of perspective. The underlying assumption of 
May LJ’s comments is that a claim worth, potentially, in the region of £20,000 is a claim of 
relative insignificance. To the vast majority of people, of course, £20,000 is a very significant 
amount of money. The increasing tendency of the courts to tell ordinary people that their 
claims are not worth the costs of adjudication is a trend entirely antipathetic to all notions 
of access to justice.  
Forensic prejudice and the capacity for a fair trial 
It is not surprising that the ability to have a fair trial looms large in many of the section 33 
decisions. The impact of the delay on the evidence is, after all, one of the specific factors 
listed in section 33(3)61. But the general conclusion of this article will be that this is a factor 
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to which too little weight is paid by the courts and that, in contrast, evidential cogency and 
the ability to have a fair trial should be the dominant factor in the exercise of section 33 
discretion.  
 Evidence can come in a number of forms62.  For present purposes it is possible to 
simplify this variety into 3 types – documentary, oral and expert. Expert evidence is 
secondary in nature – it does not purport to speak directly to what may have occurred, 
rather it is interpretive and is, therefore, dependent on the existing primary oral and 
documentary evidence. It is the cogency of this primary evidence that is in issue here, 
because expert evidence is likely to be only as cogent as the primary evidence upon which it 
is based. Documentary evidence can have an important function in some personal injury 
claims and can, sometimes, be the key and determinative evidence. For example, in a 
clinical negligence case the content of the medical records, and the expert interpretation of 
them, may often be the entirety of the liability evidence. But in most personal injury cases 
the key evidence, often the only evidence, is oral. It is people saying what happened. As 
such it is primarily recollective rather than interpretive and, as such, it is a product of human 
memory. This leads us to some of the key issues in section 33 cases – how does the passage 
of time impact upon the probative value of that recollected evidence, and how do the 
courts deal with any deficiencies in evidential cogency in making their section 33 
assessments.  
 In saying, in Adams v Ali, ‘the cogency of the evidence will undoubtedly have been 
affected to some extent [by the delay] because memories fade’ Ward LJ was echoing an 
assumption that seems common among judges – that the passage of time will necessarily 
have an adverse impact on the cogency of recollective evidence63. In one sense this 
statement has a superficial attractiveness – it is a common experience that the passage of 
time has an impact on memory. But in the context of these kinds of decisions it might have 
been hoped that judges could adopt a more subtle and nuanced approach to what they are 
actually saying about the relationship between time and memory.  
 What judges appear to be saying when they use phrases like ‘memories fade’ is that 
the passage of time makes the evidence they are hearing from a witness inherently less 
reliable. Psychological research would suggest that the position is, at the very least, less 
simplistic than that statement might suggest. As Davies puts it ‘It is a truism that memory 
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deteriorates over time’. But he goes on to say that ‘the rate of loss and whether all 
experiences are lost at the same rate are matters of continuing controversy64’. In fact, 
research into memory accuracy over time is of relatively recent vintage65. The reasons for 
this research deficit are largely methodological and can be readily appreciated66. Testing 
memory accuracy over time requires 2 things which might be difficult to achieve 
experimentally. The most obvious of these is, of course, time. The second is a means of 
assessing the factual accuracy of the base events which are being recalled. Indeed, much 
memory research has focused on memory quantity, rather than memory quality, for 
example testing recall of a list of random words or syllables67. This may not provide an 
accurate reflection of how real life memory operates. Rather, it seems that such research as 
exists would suggest that memory reliability is governed by a complex matrix of factors, of 
which time is merely one68.  Most research in the area would also seem to agree that 
autobiographical memory has a higher level of resilience than other types of memory, 
particularly if it is autobiographical memory of vivid events, as might be expected in the 
case, for example, of a claimant injured in a sudden one-off accident. Baddeley et al offer 4 
possible reasons for this, all of which would seem to make intuitive sense:- 
1. ‘such events are highly distinctive, with little danger of their being confused with 
other events; 
2. We tend to talk about such events, rehearsing them 
3. They tend to be important events that potentially change some aspects of our lives 
4. They give rise to emotions69’ 
As they also say, ‘we can easily remember experiences for a long time if they are unique70’. 
Routine, it would seem, makes life less memorable.   
Judges dealing with recollected evidence of witnesses and, even more so, claimants, 
in personal injury cases are dealing with autobiographical memory of vivid events.  While 
this does not, of course, make such evidence immune from error, it might be thought 
appropriate that judges engage in a somewhat more sophisticated assessment than that of 
the ‘memories fade’ type.  
 But there is also another aspect of memory accuracy that is of importance in the 
context of these cases. This is the question of what is being compared with what. Section 33 
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(3)(b) requires the court to have regard to ‘the extent to which, having regard to the delay, 
the evidence adduced or likely to be adduced…is or is likely to be less cogent than if the 
action had been brought [in time]’ (emphasis added). This would clearly suggest that the 
relevant comparison is that between the cogency of the evidence now, as opposed to the 
cogency of the evidence had the trial taken place at the time it might have been expected to 
have taken place had the claimant issued within the limitation period. And bearing in mind 
that the claimant could legitimately have issued at any time up until the expiry of 3 years 
from his date of knowledge, could have served the proceedings up to 4 months after that71 
and could, even if progressing the case with reasonable dispatch, have taken 18 months to 
get to trial, the question a court should be asking is how much less cogent is the evidence 
now as opposed to how cogent it might have been had the trial taken place at any point up 
to some 5 years after the claimant’s date of knowledge. Put another way, the question is 
not about the cogency of the evidence now, but about how much extra damage has been 
done to that cogency by the passage of time beyond the date when the claimant ought to 
have been getting his case before a judge. This is an important distinction because 
psychological research seems largely agreed that forgetting tends to be at its peak early in 
the time-line from the event and thereafter to flatten out. As Baddely puts the point ‘…the 
rate of forgetting is nonlinear, with amount forgotten being initially rapid, then slowing 
down72’. Koriat et al noted that research on autobiographical memory using diary entries 
showed a deterioration in accuracy over time, but that a significant amount of that 
deterioration had occurred within the first 2 ½ years73 and while Bahrick was testing 
something rather different (retention of High School Spanish) he also concluded that 
retention declined quickly in the early years but after that showed very little evidence of 
further decline over the long term74.  If these researchers are correct, this might suggest 
that the degree to which there is further significant decline in memory accuracy beyond the 
earliest time when a trial might realistically have taken place is very limited indeed. Put 
another way, judges need not be especially more suspicious of witness evidence about, say, 
the events of an accident, if it is given 6 years after the event, as opposed to 3 years after 
the event, because most of the accuracy deficit would already have occurred within that 
initial 3 year period.  
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 There is one caveat to all this which is also highlighted in the research. That is that it 
may not be sufficient to talk about memory accuracy for events as if all parts of any given 
event are remembered or forgotten in the same way. The conclusion of Gold et al was that 
while fine detail of memory decays over time, broad outline memory is much more robust75. 
Baddeley confirms the point when he says ‘…much of our autobiographical recollection of 
the past is reasonably free of error, provided we stick to remembering the broad outline of 
events. Errors begin to occur once we begin to try to force ourselves to come up with 
detailed information from an inadequate base76’.  
 Judges, of course, are not psychologists. Nor is there any need for them to be so. All 
that this research would suggest is that judges should take a more nuanced view of the 
decay of memory accuracy by the passage of time. Rather than making bland 
generalisations of the ‘memories fade’ type it might be more helpful if judges gave clearer 
analysis to the likely impact of memory decay on the particular piece of evidence in the 
case. This may include considerations of the importance of memory evidence to the issues, 
the degree of involvement of the particular witness in the events being remembered, and 
the extent to which any memory decay which may have occurred may already have 
occurred within the limitation period and is, therefore, unaffected by any subsequent delay. 
That judges may not do this consistently is illustrated by McDonnell v Walker where Waller 
LJ declined to permit the claim to proceed concluding that ‘clearly forensic prejudice had 
been suffered by the defendant or more accurately his insurers’77. Waller LJ located this 
prejudice in the realm of quantum rather than liability. This was a case where there was an 
early claim and early admission of liability but the size of the claim became greatly increased 
after proceedings were eventually commenced some seven years after the date of the 
relevant accident.  While it is entirely proper to conclude that prejudice to a defendant can 
lie in quantum just as much as it can in liability, what Waller LJ failed to do was to identify 
any evidence that had been lost or made more difficult to access, or any way in which the 
defendant would have behaved differently had it been aware of the scale of the claim at an 
earlier stage. Indeed, even had proceedings been commenced in time it is perfectly possible 
that the defendants would have found themselves in exactly the same position as the 
claimant’s medical evidence developed. This feels very much like a case in which prejudice is 
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being assumed from the mere fact of delay rather than being identified on the basis of 
tangible evidential decay.  
Conclusions 
It is now necessary to try to draw together some threads and, in particular, to consider how 
the section 33 regime as operated by the courts matches up to the four main aims 
highlighted earlier. It is clear that in applying section 33 courts adopt a multi-factorial 
approach. This is unsurprising in a regime where judges are directed to consider all the 
circumstances of the case. But it might be questioned as to whether that approach is helpful 
in advancing the aims of the law, in particular the reduction of the predictability deficit so 
far as is feasible, and the achievement of an adequate level of corrective justice.     
 As has been indicated earlier, section 33 fails entirely the aim of providing repose to 
defendants in relation to any individual acts. This is inherent in the nature of a discretionary 
regime which is not time-limited. This may, however, be of limited significance when looked 
at in terms of real-world personal injury cases. The idea behind repose is that individual 
defendants can move on from individual events free from the fear that they are still subject 
to a potential claim. But the vast majority of the real defendants in personal injury cases are 
not individuals in that sense at all. Rather they are insurance companies. It may remain 
important for insurance companies to be able to reach commercial conclusions about likely 
exposure, but so long as they can do so broadly, in a statistical sense, across their risk, they 
do not, for the most part, care too much about which individual claims may crawl out of the 
woodwork at a late stage. Claims experience will provide sufficient commercial repose for 
insurance company defendants. 
 Two of the remaining three aims are closely related. These are the degree to which 
there is a proper regard for corrective justice and the degree to which claimants are being 
treated fairly. As a broad proposition, if corrective justice is being properly served then 
claimants will be being treated fairly because wrongs, if proven to have taken place, will be 
being righted. In the absence of a powerful counter veiling imperative, a limitation system 
which obstructs the righting of wrongs would seem to be failing to satisfy an important 
purpose of the underlying law. One of the problems here, however, is that the entire 
concept of limitation periods runs the risk of failing to achieve corrective justice, not just 
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section 3378. Assuming a wrong can be proved, then preventing a claimant from succeeding 
in a claim seems to be an obstruction of corrective justice. This raises the question of 
whether the ‘mere’ passage of time represents a good counter veiling reason to justify a 
departure from corrective justice. By enacting section 33 the legislature would seem to 
suggest that it does not. The ‘mere’ passage of time is no longer a sufficiently good reason 
to bar a claim. Rather courts are directed to consider what is equitable in the context of the 
relative prejudice to claimant and defendant. Instead of putting into the balance a whole 
range of issues including what seems to be a moral consideration of the claimant’s reasons 
for delay, courts may do better to focus on the issues of forensic prejudice in order to 
determine whether or not it is still possible to do corrective justice between the parties. Put 
another way, when is it equitable to exercise section 33 discretion in favour of a claimant? 
The answer would seem to be when that claimant can prove, by evidence of sufficient 
robustness and reliability, that he has been wronged by that defendant. Because if a 
claimant who can prove that is deprived of his opportunity to do so, that is presenting to the 
defendant an unjustified windfall which enables him to escape the consequences of 
(provably) wrongfully inflicted damage. And in making that assessment about forensic 
prejudice it would be useful for courts to bear in mind who bears the burden of proof. The 
likelihood is that any deterioration in evidence will impact at least as much on claimants as 
on defendants, if not more so.  
 A concentration by the courts on forensic prejudice would also assist with the 
remaining aim that the law should seek to achieve: that is to keep the predictability deficit 
at as low a level as is reasonably possible. While any discretionary regime will involve some 
degrees of uncertainty, one focused on the ability of a claimant to prove his case relegates 
in importance such highly impressionistic considerations as the worthiness of the claimant’s 
justifications for the passage of time.  
This does not involve any major change in approach. Rather it is a shift of emphasis. The 
issue of forensic prejudice is already one of the considerations which courts evaluate. To 
suggest that they should give greater priority to this, and that they should evaluate forensic 
prejudice in a more analytical way, is no more than a plea to courts to keep firmly in focus 
the aim of righting wrongs, which is central to the common law method.          
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